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INTRODUCTION
When legal scholars think about the political role of juries, they
usually focus on jury nullification. For me, the 1761 Massachusetts
case of Erving v. Cradock has always been the classic example of
nullification in a noncriminal context.1 The case arose when a
Massachusetts shipowner brought a common law writ of trespass
against a royal revenue officer who had seized his vessel and
obtained its condemnation in a vice admiralty court on a smuggling
charge.2 The five judges on the Massachusetts Superior Court
unanimously instructed the jury that the admiralty decree of
condemnation was res judicata and a bar to the common law
trespass suit, but the jury ignored their instructions and returned
a substantial damage verdict for the shipowner.3 When the judges,
as required under Massachusetts practice, declined to set the
verdict aside, the practical political effect of the jury verdict was to
nullify enforcement of Parliament’s Navigation Acts in the Bay
Colony.4 Such jury nullification continues in civil cases today; a
more recent example is the refusal of many juries in common law
jurisdictions to follow instructions that a plaintiff ’s contributory
negligence is a bar to recovery in an action for negligence.
The political power of juries in both civil and criminal cases5 goes
far beyond mere nullification, however. Legislators and judges
affirmatively delegate political power to juries and encourage them
to exercise it far more frequently than juries assume such power for
themselves in violation of judicially prescribed norms. A central
1. Erving v. Cradock (Mass. 1761), in JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED
AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS
BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND 1773, at 553 (photo reprint 1948) (Samuel M. Quincy ed., 1865).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 553, 556.
4. See id. at 553-55.
5. This Symposium is generally limited to discussion regarding the role of civil juries.
One should note, in addition, that in a handful of jurisdictions criminal juries have greater
formal power of nullification than do civil juries and that the finality of jury verdicts of
acquittal gives criminal juries an effective power of nullification that civil juries, whose
verdicts are always subject to review, lack. But, as I hope to show in this Article, jury
nullification of criminal law is no longer what jury political power is centrally about. To
support my argument, I will cite both criminal and civil cases.
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claim in this Article, which I shall address first, is that our legal
system wants juries to exercise political power. A more important
issue, to which I will turn second—an issue that the system has not
fully resolved and thus needs to address—is not whether juries
should engage in political choice, but how they should engage in it.
I. ENCOURAGING POLITICAL CHOICE BY JURIES
Let me begin with an old and familiar example from the criminal
side—the Zenger case.6 The Zenger case is usually understood as one
in which the jury nullified the law given to it by the court and held
truth to be a defense to a criminal libel prosecution.7 But that
interpretation of the case is simply wrong. Chief Justice James
DeLancey did not instruct the jury that it had to convict Peter
Zenger of libel for printing negative statements about the colony’s
governor.8 Rather he told the jury that “as [the] facts or words in the
information are confessed the only thing that can come before you
is whether the words as set forth in the information make a libel.
And that is a matter of law, no doubt which you may leave to the
court.”9 Note that Chief Justice DeLancey did not direct the jury
that it must leave the law to the court. By implication, he agreed
with the defense counsel’s argument and told the jury that it could,
if it wished, leave the law to the court, but that it also had authority
to determine the law by itself.10 
Chief Justice DeLancey was not alone in colonial America in
delegating politically sensitive issues of law to juries. The Massa-
chusetts General Court, in its role as legislature, had done the same
6. The Trial of John Peter Zenger, 9 Geo. 2 (1735), reprinted in 17 A COMPLETE
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS 675 (T.B. Howell ed., London, T.C. Hansard 1816).
7. See, e.g., Morris D. Forkosch, Freedom of the Press: Croswell’s Case, 33 FORDHAM L.
REV. 415, 415 (1965) (“The Case of John Peter Zenger ... is referenced to as the one in which
truth as a defense to criminal libel, had been judicially accepted.”).
8. William E. Nelson, Legal Turmoil in a Factious Colony: New York, 1664-1776, 38
HOFSTRA L. REV. 69, 152 (2009) (quoting JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664-1776) 666
(1944)).
9. Id. (quoting GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 8, at 666).
10. See id. at 151-54.
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more than six decades before Zenger in a 1672 statute.11 Twenty-five
years before the statute’s passage, the General Court debated
whether discretion would be required in interpreting the provisions
of its Code of 1648 and, if so, what entities should exercise that
discretion.12 By a 1649 statute, the General Court provided that
when judges and juries in a lower court disagreed on an interpreta-
tion of the Code or on any other point of law, the case in which they
disagreed would go to the General Court and would be resolved by
a majority vote of the two houses sitting together.13 This 1649
statute provided what we can understand as an overtly political
solution—delegation to the legislature—for resolution of an issue of
legal uncertainty initially decided by a jury. 
By the 1670s, this solution was no longer a viable one. The crown
under the recently restored king, Charles II, was trying to bring its
American colonies in general and Massachusetts Bay in particular
under tighter control. The colony’s leaders recognized that royal
authorities could easily take note of political decisions its legislature
reached that were contrary to the crown’s policies.14 Accordingly, by
statute in 1672, Massachusetts abolished appeals to the General
Court in cases of judge-jury disagreement.15 The statute explicitly
gave juries, which delivered only opaque verdicts reached in
anonimity behind closed doors, authority to make final and binding
determinations of politically sensitive issues that sometimes arose
in litigation.16 The General Court thereby hid much sensitive
political decision making from royal authorities who were seeking
to transform the Bay Colony’s political processes.17
One of the leading cases decided shortly after enactment of the
1672 statute arose out of a suit brought by Edward Randolph, the
collector of customs for the crown in the late 1670s and early 1680s,
against George Hutchinson, a merchant whom Randolph accused of
11. See William E. Nelson, The Utopian Legal Order of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, 47
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 183, 201 (2005).
12. See id. at 198.
13. Id. at 200 (citing Marc DeWolfe Howe & Louis F. Eaton, Jr., The Supreme Judicial
Power in the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 20 NEW ENG. Q. 291, 292-93, 302 (1997)).
14. Id. at 201.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 200-01.
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smuggling.18 The case was remarkably similar to Erving v. Cradock
discussed above. Randolph was not a popular man in Massachusetts
Bay, and not surprisingly, the jury returned a verdict for Hutchin-
son.19 Then “[t]he Court sent out the Jury once & Againe with the
Case further to Consider of it[.] [A]t their coming in Againe they
declared by their foreman they saw no cause to Alter their virdict.”20
By so asking the jury to reconsider its verdict, the court performed
its duty of supporting royal authority. By adhering to its verdict, the
jury did what the court probably wanted to accomplish, but publicly
lacked power to do—undermine royal government and royal
enforcement of the customs laws.21
At approximately the same time that Massachusetts acted,
Maryland likewise delegated politically sensitive law-finding power
to juries. From the 1640s to the late 1680s Maryland suffered
recurrent conflict between Catholics and Protestants, which left its
legal system fragile22 and made it important for the province’s
judges to give the appearance of objectivity and impartiality in their
administration of the law: to seem above the fray.23 One way to give
such an appearance was to delegate politically difficult decisions to
jurors and put the blame on jurors when the decisions proved
unpopular. Thus, in Proprietary v. Backer, a suit arising out of an
alleged violation of the Navigation Act,24 the court “thought it most
Convenient to have a Jury of 12 able persons to go upon the meritts
of the whole bussiness, and Not that it should be whol[l]y throwne
upon the Governor and Councell.”25 As one county court declared in
another case, it was useful for judges to give tough political issues
to juries and then uphold their verdicts: litigants would understand
18. Id. at 203.
19. Id. (citing FRANCIS J. BREMER, THE PURITAN EXPERIMENT: NEW ENGLAND SOCIETY
FROM BRADFORD TO EDWARDS 172-73 (rev. ed. 1995)). “His unpopularity resulted both from
his efforts to undermine the government of the Bay Colony and to secure revocation of its
charter and from his efforts at revenue collection.” Id. at 203 n.139.
20. Randolph v. Hutchinson (Ct. Assistants 1680), in 1 RECORDS OF THE COURT OF
ASSISTANTS OF THE COLONY OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, 1630-1692, 168 (1901).
21. Nelson, supra note 11, at 203.
22. See AUBREY C. LAND, COLONIAL MARYLAND: A HISTORY 45-56, 63-66, 83-90 (1981). 
23. See William E. Nelson, 54 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. (forthcoming 2014) (on file with author).
24. See Proprietary v. Backer (Md. Provincial Ct. 1664), reprinted in 49 ARCHIVES OF
MARYLAND 393; accord Metcalf v. Derrickson (Md. Provincial Ct. 1652), reprinted in 10
ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 166.
25. Proprietary, reprinted in 49 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra note 24, at 393.
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that adverse judgments were not the judges’ “fault for it was Don[e]
by A jury.”26 
Today’s legal system continues to delegate politically difficult
issues to juries. An example is the inevitably political role that
juries play in deciding civil rights suits brought against state and
local officials under § 1983.27 When one asks, for example, why the
NAACP sought injunctive rather than damage relief in Brown v.
Board of Education,28 which was a § 1983 action,29 the answer is
plain. Damage awards—here, for African-Americans who had
received inferior educations in segregated schools—would have
improved lives by giving compensation; damage awards would have
been easier than injunctions to enforce; and the threat of future
damage awards would have produced rapid desegregation. But the
NAACP lawyers knew for certain that juries would make political
judgments in damage cases that would deny them any relief. They
accordingly opted to avoid juries by seeking injunctive relief from
judges.30
Another example is the delegation of power to juries to determine
damage awards in medical malpractice, product liability, and
similar sorts of cases. Perhaps juries in such cases can determine
damages for medical expenses and loss of wages through simple
arithmetic calculations. But calculating damages for lost body parts,
pain and suffering, and the like requires recourse to judgments of
political morality for which no arithmetically certain answers exist.
In the legal community, we understand that legislative efforts to cap
the damages which juries can give for such losses constitute an
exercise of political judgment. We similarly understand that the
decision of the Supreme Court about the application in diversity
cases of New York legislation limiting the power of juries to award
damages had a political valence.31 We therefore should understand
that a jury’s initial determination of the amount of damages is
similarly political in nature.
26. Dickeson v. Winder (Md. Sommersett Cnty. Ct. 1674), reprinted in 87 ARCHIVES OF
MARYLAND 364 (explaining statement of facts by plaintiff).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29. See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION § 1.01 (2012).
30. Brown, 347 U.S. at 487.
31. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 419 (1996).
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Ultimately I conclude it is inevitable that, as long as juries exist,
the American legal system will delegate numerous politically
difficult decisions to them. The reason for this conclusion is a
fundamental assumption I share with many other Americans about
the task of judges: judges should impartially and objectively resolve
cases on the basis of established rules, made through the democratic
political process or through customary acceptance by the community
as a whole over time—through what we call the common law. This
assumption, however, often is unworkable. Established rules cannot
always be applied to individual cases without recourse to political
morality—without deciding what sorts of litigants or what social
policies a decision maker ought to favor. 
Judges rightly strive not to make such political judgments. When
both litigants in a case seem worthy and deserving, it is morally
uncomfortable to render a decision that will result in entry of a
judgment against one of them. Moreover, making such a judgment
risks losing popular support within the local community, and the
loss of popular support can make enforcement of the judgment
difficult and even result in the judge losing her job. Jurors, in
contrast to judges, are ordinary members of the community who
possess a democratic pedigree. They function in relative anonymity.
They also know local people and conditions and thereby may have
special insight into the facts of a case. As a result, they are often
better positioned than judges to make the political choices necessary
to decide difficult cases. For all these reasons, as Maryland judges
knew over three centuries ago, it is wise to delegate political
responsibility to juries of able citizens instead of throwing the
responsibility wholly upon courts. Judges still want to be able to
claim that an unpopular decision is not their “fault for it was Don[e]
by a Jury.”32 
II. WHAT KNOWLEDGE DO JURIES NEED TO MAKE POLITICAL
CHOICES?
How should juries exercise the responsibility to make political
judgments? What knowledge should they possess as they deliberate
32. Dickeson, reprinted in 87 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra note 26, at 364.
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about a case? Should judges conceal anything about either the law
or the facts from juries? Here I want to draw a sharp distinction
between two cases—one decided in 1761 and one decided in 2006. 
In the 1761 case, nothing was hidden from the jury, which was
fully informed about the law and facts of the case. The result was a
verdict completely consistent with the values of the community from
which the jury was drawn. In the 2006 case, in contrast, certain
facts and key aspects of the law were not disclosed to the jury; as a
result, the jury returned a verdict with punitive consequences
contrary to what a number of jurors intended. In my view, it is
unjust to impose punishment greater than what was intended by
participants tasked with imposing it.
Erving v. Cradock is the 1761 case.33 In that case, the jury knew
that if it returned a substantial damage verdict against the customs
collector, the court would be required to enter judgement on the
verdict.34 Although the collector could appeal the judgment to the
Privy Council, processing the appeal would likely take well over a
year, during which time the judgment would not be stayed.35 Thus,
the collector either would have to pay the judgment or end up in
debtor’s prison.36 In rendering their verdict of £500, the jury made
a profoundly political judgment to punish the customs collector and
thereby deter him and future royal officials from interfering with
Massachusetts shipping.37 This verdict was precisely the judgment
that the community from which the jury was drawn would have
made. The verdict and judgment were, therefore, just.38
The 2006 case, State v. May,39 involved the conviction before an
Arizona court of Stephen May, a then thirty-five-year-old man, who
was charged in a seven-count indictment with sexually molesting
33. Erving v. Cradock, in QUINCY, supra note 1, at 553.
34. See id. at 556-57.
35. Arthur Meier Schlesinger, Colonial Appeals to the Privy Council II, 28 POL. SCI. Q.
443, 447-48 (1913) (finding that the Privy Council disposed of an appeal on average in twenty-
two months).
36. See Erving v. Cradock, in QUINCY, supra note 1, at 556-57.
37. Id. at 556
38. See id. at 557.
39. State v. May, No. CR 2006-030290-001 SE, at *99 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2007). I
have been consulted by May’s family in connection with his case, but I have received no
compensation.
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four children under the age of ten.40 The precise conduct with which
May was charged was touching the clothing of the children in the
vicinity of their genitals. At the time of the touching, May was
playing with three of the children, as he had done on many occa-
sions, in the swimming pool of the apartment complex in which he
and the children resided.41 He was convicted of touching the fourth
child in the classroom of the school where he was employed as a
teacher’s aide.42 The defense was that any touchings that occurred
were accidental and not sexually motivated.43 May was acquitted of
charges of touching the clothing of one of the three children in the
swimming pool.44
I have been consulted by May’s family in connection with his case,
but I have received no compensation. In the course of the consulta-
tion, I studied the trial transcript. My study of the evidence reported
in the transcript did not convince me (1) that May either did or did
not touch the children’s clothing accidentally or (2) that May was or
was not sexually motivated when he touched it. On the basis of
what I read, without of course seeing the witnesses in person, I do
not know. The jurors had similar trouble. After considering the case
for a day and a half, they reported that they could not reach a
verdict.45 The judge sent them back to reconsider with the usual
instructions, and on their third day of deliberations they again
reported that they could not reach a verdict.46 The judge then
dismissed them,47 but within an hour after their dismissal they
returned and requested permission to continue deliberations.48 Both
the state and the defendant agreed to permit the jury to continue
considering the case. After five additional hours of deliberation the
40. Transcript of Proceedings at 6-7, State v. May, No. CR 2006-030290-001 SE (Ariz.
Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2007).
41. Transcript of Proceedings at 4-9, 73-76, State v. May, No. CR 2006-030290-001 SE
(Ariz. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2007).
42. Id. at 75-76; Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 40, at 7 (Jan. 3, 2007).
43. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 41, at 4-9 (Jan. 3, 2007).
44. Transcript of Proceedings at 3-5, State v. May, No. CR 2006-030290-001 SE (Ariz.
Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2007).
45. Transcript of Proceedings at 8-9, State v. May, No. CR 2006-030290-001 SE (Ariz.
Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 2007).
46. Id. at 9.
47. Id. at 9-10.
48. Id. at 11.
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jurors returned with their verdict, convicting May on five of the
seven counts of molesting three of the four children.49 Subsequently,
May was sentenced to a term of fifteen years on each of the five
counts without possibility of parole or any reduction in time served
for good behavior.50 By statute, the sentences must run consecu-
tively, which means that May cannot be released from jail before his
110th birthday.51 Despite the sentence’s length, it should be noted
that the trial judge showed some leniency and did not impose the
maximum sentence permitted under Arizona law.
May has sought post-conviction review, in the context of which he
has raised a number of claims—about the alleged unconstitutional-
ity of the Arizona statute on which he was convicted, the procedure
by which the jury was permitted to continue considering the case,
misconduct by the jury foreman, ineffective assistance of counsel,
and other errors by the trial judge.52 I will not discuss these claims,
some of which, I predict, may lead eventually to reversal of his
conviction. I will focus only on one other claim for which May has
sought to have his conviction set aside—a claim that I believe is
central to the issues featured in this symposium issue.
The jurors, as I have noted, were troubled by the evidence. They
did not really know whether May was innocent or guilty. Only one
body of evidence pointed toward May’s guilt—four children testified
that he touched them.53 This common pattern suggested that
something beyond accident had occurred, although other evidence
about the parents’ and prosecution’s pretrial preparation of the
children suggested that the common pattern may have been
fabricated.
The initial uncertainty in the jurors’ minds was reflected in the
fact that some of them voted for guilt on all seven counts and some
voted for innocence. The jury eventually hung because some
continued to vote for guilt and some continued to vote for
innocence.54 That was the logical thing to do. The strongest evidence
49. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 44, at 3-5 (Jan. 16, 2007).
50. Id. at 29-30.
51. Id.
52. See State v. May, No. 2 CA-CR 2012-0257-PR, 2012 WL 3877855 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 295 (2013).
53. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 40, at 9 (Jan. 3, 2007).
54. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 45, at 8-9 (Jan. 12, 2007).
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of guilt was the fact that four children testified to molestation; the
strongest evidence that the charges were bogus lay in the friendship
connections among the children and in the trial preparation
procedures of the parents and prosecution. But it seems likely that
the defendant molested either all of the children or none of them.
So why did the jury ultimately reach a verdict of guilty on five
counts and not guilty on two? The answer is that the jurors
compromised. This is violative of a defendant’s rights if, in reaching
a compromise, the jurors who initially voted in favor of acquittal did
not change their belief that the evidence was insufficient for a
conviction. I am not inclined to insist, however, on this rather
technical point.55 As I will argue below, I believe that compromise
is a good phenomenon as long as it is honestly obtained. 
What troubles me about Stephen May’s case—why I find his
conviction deeply unjust—is that compromise was achieved as a
result of misinformation under which at least some and perhaps
nearly all of his jurors were acting. When the jurors reassembled
after being dismissed, the foreman told them that if they agreed on
a conviction, May would be sentenced only to a “slap[ ] on the
wrist”—more specifically that he would “probably only get a year or
two.”56 There is something fundamentally wrong, in my view, when
a compromise based on a one to two year sentence somehow results
in effectively sentencing a man to life in prison.57 
55. See David F. Abele, Comment, Jury Deliberations and the Lesser Included Offense
Rule: Getting the Courts Back in Step, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 375, 389, 392-93 (1990).
56. Affidavit of Lisa Proebev at 20 (on file with author).
57. I find Stephen May’s case oddly analogous to a case on which I worked as a young law
clerk just out of law school, United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). Elksnis had entered a guilty plea to a manslaughter charge based on a
promise by the sentencing judge that he would receive ten years in jail. Id. at 249, 254. When
it came time to impose the sentence, however, the judge, claiming he did not possess full
knowledge at the time he made his promise, reneged on the promise and, without giving
Elksnis an opportunity to withdraw his plea, sentenced him instead to twenty years. See id.
at 248. The central issue in Elksnis’s appeal was the constitutionality of judicial participation
in plea bargaining—an issue about which reasonable people might disagree. See id. at 255.
But it seemed clear to me then, as it did to Judge Edward Weinfeld when he decided the case,
id. at 250, and as it has seemed to most judges since, that when a person is deprived of his
innocence and freedom on the basis of assurances that he will receive a specified jail sentence,
he cannot be given a radically different, much greater sentence without first being restored
to the status quo prior to the assurance. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Anolik v. Comm’r of Corr., 393
F. Supp. 48, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The most efficient way to insure against false assurances
based on imperfect knowledge, which require retrials at enormous cost to all involved, is to
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No person or institution ever decided that Stephen May should
stay in jail until he is 110 years old. That sentence resulted from a
peculiar confluence of unanticipated circumstances—from the
unintended, uncontrolled turning of the wheels of the legal system.
The actions of a series of legal actors who were either ignorant of
what other actors had done or would do or who were barred from
correcting the others’ missteps, simply added up to injustice. First,
a partisan legislature, probably acting in response to egregious
cases of child molestation, enacted a statute providing severe
mandatory penalties for those guilty of the crime.58 Second, judges
who were afraid to appear soft on crime or to antagonize the law-
and-order lobby adopted a rule denying information about potential
sentences to criminal juries adjudicating guilt or innocence.59 In step
three, a democratic group of impartially chosen citizens was
prevented from reaching the compromise on which they agreed
because they could not and did not know what the actors prior to
them had done. I simply do not believe that a seventy-five year
sentence would have been imposed on Stephen May if legislators
and judges had known how the law they were making would be
applied to him or if that law had not been concealed from May’s
jurors.
The legislators and judges probably could not have anticipated
how their laws would be applied. But the jurors could have been told
and, in my view, should have been told about the law. Instead, the
law was hidden from them.
Why do I believe it is wrong to keep jurors ignorant of law and
facts that might influence their judgment? The legal system does it
all the time. Jurors are kept ignorant, for example, of a criminal
defendant’s prior criminal record, at least as long as the defendant
does not take the witness stand.60 When I was questioned some
years ago on voir dire in a civil negligence case, I and every other
prospective juror was asked whether we were acquainted with the
scene of the automobile accident at issue and whether we could
block out whatever we knew about it and decide the case only on the
make sure that decision makers possess requisite knowledge in the first place.
58. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-705 (2013).
59. See Shannon v. United States, 515 U.S. 573, 579 (1994).
60. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b), 609.
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basis of the evidence adduced at trial. The rule is uniform that a
verdict should be based only on evidence adduced at trial and law
stated by the court and not on any extrinsic knowledge jurors might
happen to possess. There is an analogous practice of striking from
criminal juries in death penalty cases anyone who states that he or
she would be conscientiously unable to vote for that penalty.61 Why,
in the face of such widespread practices, do I believe that juries
should have access to all information that might affect their verdict?
Why, you also may wonder, do I support compromise verdicts when
the law, as a general matter, is hostile to them?
My views rest on a particular conception of democracy that I hope
you will find attractive, even though it is somewhat naive and
impractical. My conception is not majoritarian. I see no reason why
some official who gets elected by one vote more than half of a voting
pool should be permitted to enact policies that are anathema to
those who lost the election.62 Legitimacy does not flow from
exploiting transient, technical advantages to obtain office.63 
The goal of a democratic decision-making body should be to adopt
widely supported policies that advance the well-being of the
61. See generally, James M. Carr, Note, At Witt’s End: The Continuing Quandary of Jury
Selection in Capital Cases, 39 STAN. L. REV. 427, 427-30 (1987) (“[D]eath qualification has
become firmly entrenched in the capital jury selection process.”).
62. I understand the argument that all votes should count equally and that the winner
of a majoritarian process accordingly has greater social support than the loser. Arguably, in
a context in which an immediate choice must be made between one of two social policies, the
policy that attracts one more vote should be preferred over the policy that attracts one less.
But that is rarely the context in which political decisions must be made. Often, other
compromise options exist that can command more than a simple majority, or there is the
option of doing nothing and preserving a longstanding, widely accepted status quo. 
A 1649 statute of the Massachusetts Bay Colony reflects this wisdom. See 1 William E.
Nelson, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE CHESAPEAKE AND NEW ENGLAND, 1607-
1660 76-77 (2008). Prior to 1649, matters came to the attention of the General Court in two
different fashions. First, the General Court served as the colony’s legislature. When so
serving, it sat as two separate houses, and both were required to approve a bill in order for
it to become law and alter the status quo. Second, the General Court heard appeals from the
Court of Assistants, in which it had to either affirm or reverse the judgment below. When it
heard such appeals, the court sat as a single body and a majority vote was dispositive. See id.
63. Thus, my difficulty with Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), is not that the Supreme
Court awarded the presidency to George W. Bush. Once the Court decided to hear the case,
it had to award the presidency to either Bush or Gore. My problem is not that Bush obtained
the office, but that he treated his occupancy of it as a mandate to enact partisan policies and
engage in a partisan war to which many who lost the case before the Supreme Court were
strongly opposed.
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governed community as a whole. Of course, it is often difficult to
know with certainty what is best for the community as a whole, and
thus the community may be sharply divided on what policies to
adopt. In the face of such division, it is unjust for the majority to
impose its views on the minority. My conception of democracy
instead requires that the leaders of a majority strive to compromise
with any minority willing to negotiate with them. 
Suppose that a legislature reaches a compromise, by using the
familiar tools of ambiguity and buck-passing, enacting a law that
papers over disagreements with ambiguous provisions that others
will need to interpret and clarify in the future. Who should interpret
the ambiguous provisions? Judge or jury? Suppose a majority,
ignoring my favored democratic approach, simply enacts its will into
law. Who should determine how that law applies to uncertain facts
in the future? Judge or jury?
There are arguments in favor of leaving decisions such as these
to judges,64 but these arguments are not based on a sound concep-
tion of democracy. Judges who hold tenure during good behavior or
who otherwise will never need to stand for reelection may be
objective and impartial decision makers, but their only democratic
ties are to the past political leaders who placed them on the bench
and who may no longer command significant public support. Judges
who face reelection, on the other hand, necessarily will be concerned
not to antagonize potential campaign contributors or interest groups
whose support they need as they seek to assemble a transient
political majority in support of their reelection.65 Such judges will
have a democratic pedigree of sorts, but will lack impartiality. 
Impartial judges, in sum, will have a weak democratic pedigree,
and democratically responsible judges will be beholden to narrow
interest groups in the polity and will therefore lack impartiality.
Only juries can be fully democratic because they are drawn
randomly from the community and at the same time are impartial,
in that their membership usually consists of a cross-section of all
groups and interests in the community that must all give their
64. See e.g., Renée Lettow Lerner, The Rise of Directed Verdict: Jury Power in Civil Cases
Before the Federal Rules of 1938, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448, 487-88 (2013).
65. See ERIC HELLAND & ALEXANDER TABARROK, JUDGE AND JURY: AMERICAN TORT LAW
ON TRIAL 71 (2006).
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consent to achieve unanimity. The uniquely democratic and
impartial character of juries is why they should continue to enjoy
the broad politically sensitive, law-making jurisdiction they possess
in the American legal system.
It is this same democratic and impartial character that also
requires allowing juries to function with full knowledge of the law
and facts related to their deliberations and condemns the conceal-
ment of relevant facts or law. Every time a matter of law or fact is
hidden from a jury, the decision of an impartial, democratic body of
the community is skewed in favor of one and against another
litigant, away from what the decision would be if the body were
permitted to act knowledgeably. In the case of Stephen May, the
concealment from the jury of the sentence the court was required to
impose meant that the jury did not return the compromise verdict
on which it had agreed—a verdict of one or two years.66 On the
contrary, the jury’s verdict resulted in a sentence for life.67 That was
a biased, undemocratic result.
I predict that commentators in the future will look back on the
seventy-five year jail sentence for the crimes of which Stephen May
was accused68—crimes that he may or may not have committed—in
the same fashion we look back on the jail sentence given to the
fictional character Jean Valjean in Les Misérables for stealing a loaf
of bread. Commentators in the future will wonder how reasonable
people could have imposed such a sentence. But the fact is that
reasonable people did not impose it. The seventy-five year sentence
just happened as the wheels of the law kept turning. No one ever
thought about it or made a decision to impose it. If anyone had
thought about it, I remain convinced he or she would not have
imposed it.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In summary, the nub of my argument is that a commitment to
democratic self-rule and impartial decision making requires that
well-informed juries, rather than judges, make the inevitably
66. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
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political judgments that are required in applying preexisting rules
of law to the facts of particular cases. Such a commitment to
democracy and impartiality further requires a return to the
eighteenth-century rule of Erving v. Cradock, when juries in
possession of plenary knowledge of everything related to the case
possessed power to render verdicts on both the law and the facts.69
As I noted earlier, however, it would be impractical to return to
the eighteenth century and naive to think that the legal system
would ever do so. In my first major scholarly work some four
decades ago, I recognized that rules of law administered by judges
in a uniform, predictable fashion are sometimes needed by citizens
who engage in transactional planning in the shadow of the law. Jury
decision making rarely can produce the uniformity and predictabil-
ity required for such transactional planning, and thus the power of
juries often must be curtailed.70 At other times, coherent visions of
justice may require concealment of prejudicial facts from juries; an
example is the rule prohibiting the admission into evidence of a
criminal defendant’s prior criminal convictions unless they are
relevant to impeaching the credibility of a defendant who takes the
witness stand.71 Rules prohibiting the admission of irrelevant
evidence also are required to ensure that trials can be completed
within a reasonable period of time.72
Thus, there are good reasons why the rule of Erving v. Cradock
will not again become the law. Legislators and judges rather than
juries will often make political decisions about the substance of the
law and will strive to bind juries to their decisions. At other times,
judges with good reason will conceal facts from juries. Thus, I
cannot plausibly urge that juries should be given plenary power to
make political decisions about how the law should apply in every
individual case. But I can argue that there ought to be a presump-
tion in favor of such jury power, and that the presumption should be
overcome only when specific good reason exists to overcome it.
Increasing the percentage of criminal convictions that prosecutors
69. Erving v. Cradock, in QUINCY, supra note 1, at 553.
70. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 at 165-171 (1975).
71. See supra note 60.
72. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 402.
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can obtain by concealing the severity of the sentence to which a
guilty verdict will lead is not, to my mind, a good reason. Similarly,
I find it foolish to instruct jurors to ignore whatever experience they
may have had at an intersection where an accident they are
adjudicating occurred. It is simply not possible for people to forget
experience that may be relevant to an issue they are being asked to
decide.
Two other objections to what I have proposed finally need to be
addressed. The first is an objection about discretion and inequality.
A standard objection to the exercise of discretion by any person or
entity is that random beneficiaries either will be favored or will get
lucky and as a result will have better outcomes than others who are
similarly situated. Juries that make discretionary political judg-
ments, it might be objected, are especially likely to produce unequal
and unfair results. I do not disagree. But what is the right remedy?
To the extent that equality is achieved by imposing bad outcomes on
everyone, as I believe happened, for example, with the federal
sentencing guidelines, I oppose the limitation or complete abolition
of discretion. Unless jury or other discretion can be eliminated in a
fashion that guarantees the best possible outcome to all, that
discretion should be preserved as a vehicle for producing good
outcomes at least for some. 
The final objection is whether unguided, unrestricted juries are
capable of the level of compromise required to render unanimous or
near unanimous verdicts. It might be thought that the high level of
political disagreement that seems nowadays to paralyze the
American legislative process will also infect political decision
making by juries if they are not tightly guided and restrained.73 My
response to this objection is that the political discretion that juries
exercise is different from that of legislative politics in two respects.
First, juries deal with individuals, whereas national and state-wide
political processes deal with stereotypes. Two voters with clashing
stereotypes of, for example, undocumented immigrants, may never
agree on legislative immigration reform. But when those voters
need to evaluate the life and doings of a particular immigrant
73. See PEW RES. CTR., TRENDS IN AMERICAN VALUES: 1987-2012: PARTISAN POLARIZATION
SURGES IN BUSH, OBAMA YEARS (2012), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-
pdf/06-04-12%20Values%20Release.pdf.
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appearing in a case before them, I remain optimistic that both will
abandon their stereotypes and focus on justice for an individual
whom they come to know. Second, jurors are not making law. Unlike
a citizen in a voting booth, whose purpose is to direct the future
course of the polity, a juror is concentrating on doing justice to those
involved in the litigation. Jury verdicts are not transmitted to the
future and thus have no direct impact on it. Although Americans
may disagree sharply about the future they want, I think we still
agree strongly on core values—that the injured should be compen-
sated, that the guilty should be punished, and that children should
have the opportunity to pursue their dreams—values that are at the
core of justice. Thus, although citizens may not agree on how to
steer the nation in the future, I think most still do agree on how to
treat with justice people they come to know in the present.
America does not have a history of numerous hung juries. I am
convinced that Americans still share enough common values that we
should not fear that giving juries broad political discretion will
generate such a history now. And, if in an occasional case, a series
of juries deadlock, such deadlock might just tell us that we should
take our burden of proof instructions seriously—that, in a civil case,
juries did not reach a verdict because a plaintiff did not produce a
preponderance of evidence, or that, in a criminal case, jurors had a
reasonable doubt.
